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1. INTRODUCTION
In September 2016, a new city network, the Global Parliament of Mayors (GPM), will be convened 
in  The  Hague,  the  Netherlands.  This  global  network  of  mayors,  initiated  by  political  theorist 
Benjamin Barber, will unite cities from all over of the world to work together on issues such as 
climate change, refugees, pandemic diseases, inequality and urban security (Global Parliament of 
Mayors Project, 2016). By cooperating on these global problems, the GPM is not only argued to be 
tackling the world’s most urgent problems, it  is  also argued to be “rescuing democracy for the 
twenty-first  century”  (Barber,  2013,  back  cover).  According  to  Barber  (2013),  nation-states  in 
global governance are “dysfunctional”. Cooperation between nation-states, for example on the issue 
of climate change, often ends up in gridlocks (Chan, 2016). Also, nation-states are increasingly 
struggling with a “democratic deficit”, breaking down the legitimacy of their policies  (Chan, 2016). 
Cities, on the contrary, can cooperate pragmatically with an indifference for borders (Barber, 2013). 
Thus, city networks will “democratize globalization” (Barber, 2013, p. 4).
Barber’s claim that city networks, and the GPM specifically, will  “save” democracy is build on two 
assumptions. First of all, Barber’s democratic alternative is build on the idea that democracy should 
be saved in the first place. Transformationalist scholars over the last couple of decades have argued 
that globalization has caused a democratic deficit  in todays state-centered liberal  democracy, in 
which the accountability of democratic institutions has become increasingly unclear (Bäckstrand, 
2006; Chan, 2016). Next to this, globalization is argued to be favoring developed countries or the 
“Global North”, leaving the “Global South” behind and increasing the gap between rich and poor 
(Bardhan,  Bowles,  & Wallerstein,  2006).  Second,  by arguing that  cities  and city  networks will 
democratize globalization, Barber takes on a certain perspective on democracy. Barber builds on the 
idea of cosmopolitan democracy, in which the world exists of one political community and the 
individual  is  central  to  democracy  (Held,  1995).  Taking  these  two  assumptions  into  account, 
Barber’s argues that cities and city networks should democratize global governance.  
The increasing role of cities and city networks in global governance is not only a normative idea, it 
is also an empirical development. Global membership of cities in city networks has grown rapidly 
over  the  last  couple  of  decades  (Betsill  & Bulkeley,  2004).  Especially  on the  issue of  climate 
change, cities and city networks have received signifiant international recognition as a potential 
addition to, or alternative for, inter-state cooperation due to their local expertise and direct involved 
in the consequences of climate change (Gordon, 2013). In terms of democratic level, however, the 
increase of city networks remains a relatively unexplored development within the field of political 
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science (Aarsæther, Nyseth, & Bjørnå, 2011). Thus, to assess Barber’s claim and investigate the role 
of city networks in global governance, the research question of this study is:  Do city networks 
enhance democracy in global governance?
To answer the research question, this study will consist of two parts – a normative part and an 
empirical part. In part I, a theoretical framework will be set up by elaborating on the work of Barber 
(2013).  It  is  argued  that  Barber  takes  on  a  cosmopolitan  perspective  on  democracy.  Thus,  the 
subquestion of this section is: What are the core principles of a cosmopolitan democracy? After the 
literature on cosmopolitan democracy is discussed, it  will  be explained how Barber’s notion of 
democracy reflects a cosmopolitan democracy perspective. Ultimately, two democratic criteria are 
distinguished – accountability and inclusive participation. In part II, the criteria defined in the first 
section will be applied on two environmental networks – the transnational municipal network C40 
and the international network UNEP. By comparing a city-to-city network and a nation-to-nation 
network,  it  will  be  possible  to  answer  the  second  subquestion:  Do  city  networks  enhance 
accountability and participation in global governance? It will be concluded that city networks do 
not have a higher level of accountability or inclusiveness than international networks, and thus do 
not necessarily enhance democracy in global governance. 
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PART 1: SETTING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2. THEORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION
This  section  will  explore  the  relation  between  globalization  and  democracy  and  defines  the 
theoretical framework on todays democracy. It will discuss the consequences of globalization for 
liberal democracy and explain the alternative of a cosmopolitan model of democracy. Elaborating 
on the work of Held (1995) and other cosmopolitan scholars, two core democratic principles will be 
defined: accountability and inclusive participation. Finally, the cosmopolitan model of democracy 
will be described.
Globalization and Liberal Democracy
Over the course of the last decades, interconnectivity has increased rapidly. The global economy 
nowadays depends upon complex chains of production and exchange, stretching from one side of 
the globe to the other. Moreover, global interconnectivity does not only address the economy, it is 
evident  in  virtually  every  aspect  of  contemporary  social  life  (McGrew,  1997,  p.  6).  Money, 
information, crime, pollution, migrants, ideas, news, images, amongst other things, frequently flows 
across  national  territorial  borders.  In  the broad sense of  the word,  globalization can simply be 
defined as the growing global interconnectedness (McGrew, 1997, p. 7). Using the concept in this 
paper, however, globalization mainly refers to its effect of blurring the line between state borders 
and the deepening enmeshment of the local and global. As the world becomes more interconnected, 
the distinction between what is internal and what is external of the state is blurring increasingly 
(McGrew, 1997, p. 7).
It is argued that this effect of globalization has significant consequences for liberal democracy, as it 
challenges the basic principles of Westphalian democracy (McGrew, 1997, p. 6). The democratic 
system of Western countries still  dates back to the seventeenth century, when the state-centered 
Westphalian system was set up. The central principles of this Westphalian order are (1) territoriality 
– states have fixed boundaries which define the scope of their political authority; (2) sovereignty – 
the  state  claims effective  and legitimate  supremacy and the  right  to  rule  over  its  territory;  (3) 
autonomy - the state is entitled to have their own internal and external affairs and (4) legality - there 
is no legal authority beyond the state; even international law can be ignored by states (McGrew, 
1997,  p.  3).  After  the  Westphalian  order  had  consolidated  the  rulers’ sovereignty  over  their 
territories, the growth of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has strengthened the 
relationship  between  the  Westphalian  order  and  sovereign  states  even  more.  Today,  liberal 
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democratic principles and practices have almost exclusively become associated with the sovereign 
territorial nation-state (Held, 1996).
However, scholars vary enormously on their perspectives as to what extent globalization affects 
liberal democracy (McGrew, 1997, p. 9). One of the main debates on globalization is about the 
continuity  and  change  of  globalization.  Some  scholars  argue  that  the  contemporary  phase  of 
globalization is a radical break with the past, whereas others argue that globalization is a process of 
historical  continuity  (McGrew,  1997,  p.  9).  The  first  group  is  also  referred  to  as  the 
transformationalists,  whereas the latter  are called  the sceptics.  Skeptic scholars,  such as Gilpin 
(1978) and Krasner (1993), dispute the view that globalization necessarily diminishes the power, 
functions or authority of the nation-state (McGrew, 1997, p. 11). Skeptics point out that states are 
becoming more important in regulating and facilitating processes of globalization.  Some would 
even argue that globalization is not decreasing the power of the state at all, but is instead controlled 
by  hegemonic  powers  to  stimulate  the  international  political  economy  (Gilpin,  1987,  p.  10). 
Transformationalists  scholars,  on  the  other  hand,  argue  that  contemporary  globalization 
fundamentally  compromises  the  institutions  of  the  Westphalian  order  and  thus  poses  distinct 
challenges to liberal democratic forms of governance (McGrew, 1997, p. 11). 
Transformationalists  also  argue  that  globalization  is  linked  to  the  emergence  of  new  political 
institutions, such as international non-governmental organizations, transnational social movements 
and transnational municipal networks. The political role of such actors on the international stage is 
often  described  by  the  term  global  governance.  Global  governance  not  only  describes  formal 
political institutions, it includes “systems of rule at all levels of human activity” (Rosenau, 1995, p. 
13). This means that informal institutions, for example the ‘civil society’, are also seen as actors in 
governing. Organizations such as Amnesty International or the transnational municipal network C40 
conduct their own foreign policy and actively participate in global governance. Global governance 
acknowledges that world politics consists of both international actors as well as transnational actors 
(Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p. 190). The focus of global governance is thus not only that of 
specific actors, it is also about norms, rules, and standards that structure and constrain social activity 
(Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p. 190).
Although  a  distinction  is  made  between  transformalist  scholars  and  sceptic  scholars  of 
globalization, many theories and studies do not specifically belong to one of these perspectives but 
are  somewhere  in  between.  Cosmopolitan  democracy  is  one  of  those  theories  that  cannot  be 
qualified  as  either  transformalist  or  sceptic.  However,  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that 
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cosmopolitan democracy as well  as  Barber’s  perspective do argue that  nowadays democracy is 
challenged by globalization (Held,  1995;  Barber,  2013).  They do not,  however,  reject  the state 
entirely and are therefore skeptical on the effects of globalization as well. In the following section, 
cosmopolitan democracy and its core principles will be discussed in further depth.
The Core Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy
In  his  book  Democracy  and  the  Global  Order:  From  the  Modern  State  to  Cosmopolitan 
Governance,  Held  (1995)  introduces  the  notion  of  cosmopolitan  democracy.  In  his  book  Held 
(1995) argues that democracy has to be rethought, and along with it the underlying principles and 
practices of democratic politics (Held, 1995, preface p. x). The cosmopolitan perspective could be 
defined as transformationalist, as it identifies the current globalization as the emergence of a post-
Westphalian order in which sovereignty and territoriality are irreversibly getting loose from modern 
political life (McGrew, 1997, pp. 19-20; Held, 1995, pp. 89-92). Yet, it also states that the age of the 
nation-state is by no means over. According to Held (1995, pp. 94-96), the importance of the nation-
state  and nationalism,  territorial  independence and the  desire  to  maintain  sovereignty  have not 
significantly  diminished  in  recent  times.  Globalization  largely  remains  in  the  domains  of 
communication and information, and does not challenge the state in creating a sense of common 
human purpose, interest and value. Thus, Held states that scholars predicting the “end of the state” 
fail to recognize the enduring capacity of the state (Held, 1995, p. 96). 
However, Held (1995) does argue that globalization affects liberal democracy and that the meaning 
and place of democratic politics has to be rethought. He defines three clear consequences of  the 
globalization processes. First of all, the increasing interconnectedness is changing the nature, scope 
and capacity of the sovereign state from above as its regulatory ability is challenged. Second, the 
regional  and  global  connectedness  that  creates  chains  of  interlocking  political  decisions  and 
outcomes  alters  the  nature  and dynamics  of  national  political  systems themselves.  Third,  local 
groups  and  movements  are  questioning  the  nation-state  from  below  as  a  representative  and 
accountable  power  system  (Held,  1995,  p.  267).  These  developments  are  problematic  as  the 
accountability of states decreases. While the principles and practice of liberal democracy are still 
expressed  in  the  institutional  structures  and  domestic  politics  of  the  nation-state,  the  state  can 
decreasingly be held accountable (McGrew, 1997;  Held,  1995).  Thus,  Held defines the lack of 
accountability in global governance as being problematic. This arguments is supported by many 
other scholars, arguing that international institutions are increasingly facing a ‘democratic deficit’ 
and  inadequate  accountability  mechanisms  (e.g.  Bäckstrand,  2006;  Chan,  2016).  Consequently, 
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Held (1995, preface ix) argues that if democratic theory is concerned with ‘what is going on’ in the 
political world, it is necessary to rethink the nature, form and content of democratic politics. 
In  rethinking  democracy,  Held  (1995)  starts  off  by  defining  the  main  purpose  of  democracy. 
According to Held (1995), the idea of democracy derives its power and significance from the idea 
of  self-determination.  Citizens  should  be  able  to  choose  freely  the  conditions  of  their  own 
association, and their own choices should thus constitute the ultimate legitimation of policies (Held, 
1995, p. 147). On the basis of the justification of public decision-making lies the promotion and 
enhancement of this autonomy. By ‘autonomy’, Held refers to ‘the capacity of human beings to 
reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and the be self-determining. It involves the ability to 
deliberate, judge, choose and act upon different possible courses of actions in private as well as 
public life, bearing the democratic good’ (Held, 1995, p. 146).
The principle of autonomy as the main purpose of democracy is reflected in the way democracy 
should be constituted. As noted in the previous section, the traditional doctrines of the relation 
between the state and its citizens, namely the idea of state sovereignty and territoriality, have been 
contested. As an alternative for sovereignty, Held thus argues for the ‘principle of autonomy’. The 
principle of autonomy is explained as follows:
 
“Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the specification 
of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them; 
that is, they should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own 
lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate to rights of others”
(Held, 1995, p. 147)
The principle of autonomy, however, is not an individualistic principle. In relation to the state, this 
concept not only means that people should be self-determining, it also means that the democratic 
government should be a government in which the principle of autonomy is ensured as much as 
possible (Held, 1995, p. 147). After Held has defined the principle of autonomy as the main purpose 
of democracy, he elaborates on the question how, and in what ways, this principle of autonomy 
should be realized in relation to the state. Held (1995) argues that to incorporate the principle of 
autonomy in  existing  institutions,  inclusive  participation  is  crucial.  Citizens  should  be  able  to 
participate in the decision-making process as much as possible to ensure their autonomy. If people 
cannot  fully  participate  in  their  political  community,  their  potential  autonomy  will  remain 
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unfulfilled. By maximizing political participation, citizens would have the ability to make choices 
and to determine the course of their lives (Held, 1995, pp. 207-211).
Archibugi (2008) – also a cosmopolitan democratic scholar – argues that todays global governance 
does not enhance inclusive participation. Instead, the global market economy and the consolidated 
institutions of global governance are dominated by the West. It is argued that global governance 
today decreases inclusive participation as globalization is considered to be favoring richer, more 
developed countries (Bardhan, Bowles, & Wallerstein, 2006). Due to these unequal access in global 
governance,  the  gap between the  rich  Global  North  and the  poorer  Global  South  is  increased. 
According to Archibugi (2008, p. 4), cosmopolitan democracy opposes this idea of a “fortress in the 
western area” by introducing the idea of one political community in which it is impossible to draw a 
line between “us” and “them”, or between “friends” and “enemies”. Hence, inclusive participation 
of  both  citizens  from  the  South  as  well  as  citizens  from  the  North  is  a  core  principle  of 
cosmopolitan democracy.
Held (2009, pp. 538-540) has defined more principles of cosmopolitanism such as “active agency”, 
“consent” and “avoidance of serious harm”. However, he acknowledges that these principles are 
hard to sustain in a world with a plurality of values and a diversity in moral conceptions.  But 
although the principles of, for example, consent and tolerance could be rejected, a cosmopolitan 
democracy should at least set down a set of procedural principles for political life, to “pursue the 
deliberative justification […] and ensure the accountability of power in all its forms” (Held, 2009, p. 
540). In this paper it is argued that the core principles of cosmopolitan democracy are best defined 
as accountability and inclusive participation. 
A Cosmopolitan Model of Democracy
To address the principles of cosmopolitanism, Held (1995; 2009) pleas for an alternative democratic 
model which he calls a cosmopolitan model of democracy. To enhance the principle of autonomy, 
humanity  must  be  viewed  as  one  universal  community.  This  means  that,  according  to 
cosmopolitism, the world order exists of both states and people (Brown, 1992). It is argued that to 
ensure the cosmopolitan principles, citizenship cannot be based on an exclusive membership of a 
community. Instead, citizenship should be based on the general rules and principles that are defined 
by cosmopolitanism (Held, 2009, p. 541). If freedom is threatened by the behavior of nations and 
states, this will go at expense of what is right for the political community – namely the principle of 
autonomy. A cosmopolitan law transcends the claim of political legitimacy of nations and states and 
extends it to the universal community (Held, 1995, p. 233). However, as noted before, Held also 
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acknowledges that this is not to say that states and national politics would become redundant. They 
would just ‘wither away’, so that they would no longer be the sole centre of legitimate power within 
their own border (Held, 1995, p. 233).
To realize this universal community and cosmopolitan law, a democratic cosmopolitan order should 
be constituted. Held (1995, pp. 268-272) argues that, as the hierarchical structure of the states has 
been disputed in times of globalization, democratizing global governance would need a horizontal 
structure. To govern the cosmopolitan community, the global order would consists of multiple and 
overlapping networks of power. These networks would involve the body, welfare, culture, civic 
associations, the economy, coercive relations and regulatory and legal relations. It would constitute 
the  interconnections  of  the  different  people  and  nations  in  the  world,  as  people  can  enjoy 
membership in the diverse communities  which significantly affect  them. This  idea of  networks 
governing one political community is also reflected in Barber’s perspective of democracy, which 
will be explained later on.
Several  scholars  have  elaborated  on  Held’s  idea  of  a  cosmopolitan  democracy  more  recently. 
Whereas Held has a top-down approach by proposing the formation of an authoritative assembly of 
all democratic state and agencies, more recent students of cosmopolitan democracy have argued for 
a bottom-up approach (Dryzek, 1996; Bohman, 1999; Cochran, 2002). Held’s idea for a “world 
government”  in  a  cosmopolitan  democracy  has  been  criticized,  as  it  would  yield  the  same 
hierarchical  structure  that  Held  has  been  criticizing  himself  in  nowadays  global  governance 
(Cochran, 2002, pp. 520-523). A bottom-up approach of cosmopolitan democracy, on the contrary, 
emphasizes  the  role  of  the  individual  in  producing  the  kind  of  change  that  a  cosmopolitan 
democracy requires (Cochran, 2002, p. 543). As the cosmopolitan model of democracy states that 
the autonomy of individuals is the main purpose of democracy, the individual should also be the 
starting point of decision-making. Moreover, democratizing global governance will not happen at 
all, if there is no positive movement by citizens towards democratization in the first place (Dryzek, 
1996, pp. 6-8).
In conclusion, it is argued that the principle of autonomy is defined by cosmopolitan democracy as 
the main purpose of democracy. To obtain this principle in global governance, two related principles 
are defined – namely accountability and inclusive participation. These core principles are reflected 
in Held’s idea of a cosmopolitan democratic order, in which governance consists of overlapping 
networks on multiple issues. The networks are argued to be increasing accountability, as they would 
all  obey  one  cosmopolitan  democratic  law.  Next  to  this  a  cosmopolitan  democratic  order  will 
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increase inclusive participation, as all people belong to the same community and thus have the same 
access to the variety of forms of participation. In the next session, it will be argued how Barber 
(2013) builds on this argument by stating that cities should be the main actors of decision-making.
 11
3. BARBER’S DEMOCRACTIC PERSPECTIVE 
In the next section, the democratic alternative of Barber (2013) will be examined according to the 
cosmopolitan  principles  of  democracy  defined  above.  Comparing  Barbers  perspective  and  the 
model of cosmopolitan democracy, the argument is made that Barber’s perspective of democracy is 
build  on the  idea of  a  cosmopolitan democracy.  Finally,  it  will  be  argued how the democratic 
criteria of accountability and inclusive participation are reflected in Barber’s argument.
The City as the Main Actor
Although Held (1995) raises the idea of one world government, several other scholars have put 
forward alternatives to achieve a cosmopolitan democracy. One of those alternatives is governance 
through the city. Today, over fifty percent of the world’s population lives in cities, a percentage that 
will  only increase over  the next  couple of  decades (Barber,  2013).  Due to the high density of 
citizens in cities, issues such as climate change, terrorism and migration have a huge impact on 
cities. As a result, the city is increasingly becoming an important political actor on the world stage 
(Van der Pluijm & Melissen, 2009). Introducing the term ‘global city’, Sassen (2001) was one of the 
first to write about the growing influence of the city in international relations. Sassen states that 
cities  constitute  the  place  where  globalization  materializes,  combining  global  flows  of  money, 
information and people through transnational networks of cities. She therefore argues that “the city 
is a far more concrete space for politics than the nation” (Sassen, 2004, p. 655). 
Elaborating  on  Sassen’s  argument,  Barber  (2013)  pleas  for  a  democratic  system  of  global 
governance in which cities take on a more important role. According to Barber, cities share unique 
qualities that make them more suitable to govern in the 21st century than states. These qualities 
include  pragmatism,  civic  trust,  indifference  to  borders  and  sovereignty,  and  a  penchant  for 
networking,  creativity,  innovation and cooperation (Barber,  2013).  Cities are pragmatic because 
mayors have to face and solve practical problems directly. This also makes the civic trust higher, 
since mayors stand closer to the people and are more directly involved with the local community 
(Barber, 2013). Whilst their mandate is local, cities can also easily participate on the global level 
due to their indifference to borders and sovereignty. Cities do not have tensions or conflict with 
other  cities  as  nation-states  have  with  other  nation-states  and  thus  they  can  cooperate  more 
pragmatically  (Barber, 2013). This makes that they are more useful in networking, innovation and 
cooperation.  Whereas nation-states cities  mainly think in terms of  sovereignty and nationalism, 
cities can think globally, but act locally (Barber, 2013).
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Although Barber also acknowledges the pitfalls of the city such as its inequality, corruption, and 
predatory markets, he argues that these problems are most effectively tackled by cooperation of 
cities (Barber, 2013). Mayors specifically are the right public officials to realize this, since they are 
presumed to be pragmatic problem solvers. Not only do mayors stand closer to the people and the 
problems coming with them, they are also less ideological and thus more pragmatic. A striking 
example of such pragmatism that Barber gives is Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem. Getting 
into power in 1965, Kollek had to deal with the consequences of the ’67 war and the occupation of 
East Jerusalem shortly after his election. His response, however, was to act solely pragmatic. He 
pledged full equality for services and parity of Jerusalem. Amidst of all the conflict and tensions, 
Kollek  focused  on  managing  basic  facilities  such  as  picking  up  the  garbage  and  fixing  roads. 
Illustratively, he once said: “Look, I’ll fix your sewers if you knock off the sermons” (Kollek, 1985 
in Barber, 2013). 
Despite the great emphasis on the role of mayors, Barber does not plea for mayors to get more 
involved in global governance independently. More specifically, Barber (2013) argues for cities to 
rule through networks. Cooperation between cities, especially in the form of networks, will decrease 
gridlocks in international decision-making. Barber states that cities are naturally networked. Cities 
are interdependent from other cities, not just because of modern globalization but also because they 
have always defined themselves through “bridging capital” instead of “bonding capital” (Barber, 
2013, p. 113). Whereas states have borders that define their territory and are unified internally, cities 
do not have this internal bonding and derive their identity from hooking up with domains outside 
their  boundaries.  According  to  Barber  (2013),  the  internal  bonding  of  nations,  propagated  by 
nationalistic symbols such as flags and anthems, is exactly what gives them a disadvantage over 
cities on the world stage. Therefore, states do not, in theory, need each other. Cities, on the other 
hand, are naturally interdependent. In many cases, trade has been at the heart of how cities originate 
and are constituted – for example in the case of Amsterdam, Hong Kong, San Diego or Rio de 
Janeiro. And even if trade is not at the heart of some cities, they are still networked in their great 
diversity  of  functions.  Cities  already  “naturally”  cooperate  on  a  myriad  of  issues  such  as 
environment,  migration,  terrorism,  transportation,  housing  and  heritage,  among  others  (Barber, 
2013,  pp.  113-121).  Hence,  governing  pragmatically  through  such  networks  is  and  must  be, 
according to Barber, the future of democratic governance.
The networking that is happening now is usually informal. It governs through voluntary cooperation 
and  shared  consensus,  often  without  any  formal  commitments  written  down.  Barber  (2013), 
however,  pleas for a formal network of mayors which he has named the Global Parliament of 
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Mayors (GPM). According to Barber (2013), cities should have a more important role in global 
governance with mayors as the main public officials to fulfill this role. The GPM, however, is not a 
proposal for an entirely new network that replaces other networks that will give a mandate for top-
down governing of megacities. It is, using Barbers words, “no more than a final step down a road 
already well traveled”. Since cities are cooperating on so many levels already, the GPM would just 
enhance and improve collaborations of the already existing networks. To exert influence it would 
only use soft power, not hard power, and announce and share best practices. It would, however, be 
innovative in that it would empower cities by giving them a “megaphone” that allows them to be 
heard in their urban resistance (Barber, 2013, pp. 336-339). 
From Independent Polis to Interdependent Cosmopolis
According to Barber (2013, p. 53) “the story of cities is the story of democracy”. Although Barber 
frequently mentions the democratic nature of the city, it remains somewhat unclear what kind of 
democracy Barber has in mind (Denters, 2015). In many aspects, however, it can be argued that his 
proposal  to democratize governance reflects a cosmopolitan democracy perspective.  One of the 
main similarities is the acknowledgement that global governance should be democratized globally. 
Whereas some IR scholars still argue for the nation-state as the main actor in international politics, 
Barber (2013) argues in line with cosmopolitan democracy scholars that other actors, in Barber’s 
case the city, play an increasingly important role in global governance. Moreover, to democratize 
global governance the role of other actors should not only be acknowledged, they should also get 
more power over decision-making in the international policy-making process. Consequently, Barber 
(2013) and Held (1995) both argue for a reform of the international order towards a system in which 
the nation-state is not the main actor of decision-making any longer.
The  main  argument  that  Barber  (2013)  takes  on  from  cosmopolitan  democratic  theory  is  the 
development from a state-centric democracy to a democracy in which the individual is at the centre 
of democracy. As Held (2009, p. 542) points out: “There is only a historical contingent connection 
between the principles underpinning citizenship and the national community; as this connection 
weakens  in  a  world  of  overlapping  communities  of  fate,  the  principles  of  citizenship  must  be 
rearticulated and re-entrenched”.  According to both Held (1987; 1995) and Barber (2013)  this 
rearticulated citizenship takes place in the global community of an interdependent world, in which 
the autonomy of the individual is the main purpose of democracy. This argument is coming back in 
Barber’s perspective, as he argues that “the citizen is the sovereign” (Barber, 2016). By defining the 
citizen as the sovereign instead of the nation-state, Barber pleas for a cosmopolitan democracy in 
which, in his own words: “cosmopolitanism trumps patriotism” (Barber, 2013, p. 115). 
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In  accordance with  cosmopolitan  democracy,  Barber  (2013)  also  argues  that  there  should  be  a 
transitional  process  from  state-centric  governments  to  a  networked  form  of  governance  with 
decentred, distributed nodes of authority (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2015, pp. 213-214). Barber (2013) 
states  that  the  existing  city  networks  will  democratize  global  governance  as  they  are  open, 
horizontal networks. This horizontal structure that lacks the ‘authoritative’ and ‘hierarchical’ aspect 
that nation-states have, is seen by Barber as a democratic quality of city networks. If city networks 
would be the main actors in global governance, this would give expression to the “unique urban 
potential for cooperation and egalitarianism” of cities (Barber, 2013, p. 9). Networks, in general, are 
often portrayed as more equal institutions because of their horizontal character (Bouteligier, 2013, 
p.  251).  City  networks  specifically,  are  assumed to  be  even  less  hierarchical,  because  of  their 
penchant for networking and cooperation (Barber, 2013, pp. 106-107).
Not only does Barber (2013) built on the idea of a cosmopolitan democracy in general, he also takes 
on  the  underlying  principles  of  cosmopolitan  democracy  –  accountability  and  inclusive 
participation. In both principles, the notion of “glocality” is important. This means that cities can 
connect the local to the global, creating “glocal” governance (Barber, 2013). Barber states that if the 
role of cities in global governance increases, the accountability of global governance will increase 
because mayors will be held accountable by their citizens. As mayors and local governments stand 
closer to their citizens than national governments, the popular control will be higher (Barber, 2013, 
pp. 95-100). As for inclusive participation, Barber (2013) also argues that the role of cities in global 
governance  is  essential.  Cities  connect  the  local  to  the  global  and  thus  increase  inclusive 
participation. The cosmopolitan characteristics of cities do not only empower cities to act on the 
global stage, but it also connects the distinct global governance to everyday local life (Barber, 2013; 
Chan, 2016).
In short, Barber’s perspective on democracy reflects the idea of a cosmopolitan democracy in three 
ways. Just like Held (1995), Barber states that liberal democracy is challenged by globalization and 
that the state should no longer be the main actor of decision-making in global governance. He 
argues  in  line  with  cosmopolitan  democracy that  the  individual  should  be  the  main  subject  of 
democracy instead.  Therefore,  democracy needs to be reformed.  Although Barber,  unlike Held, 
pleas for cities to realize this cosmopolitan democracy, both scholars argue for governance through 
networks.  Also,  Barber  (2013)  uses  the  same  core  principles  to  define  democracy  –  namely 
inclusive  participation  and  accountability.  Overall,  it  can  be  concluded  that  Barber  takes  on  a 
cosmopolitan  perspective  of  democracy.  The  two  principles  of  cosmopolitan  democracy  can 
 15
therefore be applied on the comparison of two governance networks, to examine whether Barber’s 
claim – that city networks will democratize governance – is true.
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PART 2: COMPARING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE NETWORKS
4. DATA AND METHOD
A Comparative Study
To assess whether city networks enhance democracy in global governance, a comparative study 
between a city-to-city network and a nation-to-nation network will be conducted. Building on the 
democratic criteria defined in the previous section, the C40 and the UNEP will be analyzed and 
compared.  If  the  city-to-city  network indeed has  a  higher  level  of  accountability  and inclusive 
participation than in the nation-to-nation network, it could be argued that city networks enhance 
democracy  in  global  governance.  Data  are  collected  from databases,  public  documents,  media 
reports and secondary sources in the form of published journal articles.
For this study, it is decided to compare two environmental networks. There are two main reasons 
why environmental networks are the most suitable to compare. First of all, a considerable number 
of  city  networks  are  focused  on  environmental  issues  (Barber,  2013,  p.  130).  Compared  to 
transnational networks on other issues, environmental networks are often more far-reaching in city 
cooperation. If  city networks thus democratize global governance, this should most possibly be 
apparent in transnational environmental networks. Second, cities face similar challenges to nation-
states  in  cooperating together  on climate  change issues  (Koski  & Lee,  2014).  This  makes  that 
environmental city networks and international networks are more comparable than, for example 
networks  on  security,  in  which  city  networks  discuss  very  different  issues  than  international 
networks. Thus, if there is a difference in the level of democracy in both networks, it will be likely 
due to the different actors and it will unlikely because of the nature of the subject.
C40
The  city  network  that  will  be  analyzed  is  the  C40.  The  C40  Climate  Leadership  Group  is  a 
transnational organization of 83 megacities that cooperate on climate change. Members commit to 
make an effort in cooperating on global environmental issues in order to make more impact globally 
(Chan, 2016). They “collaborate effectively, share knowledge and drive meaningful, measurable 
and sustainable action on climate change” (C40, 2016a). The C40 is one of the most influential and 
most active city-networks engaging in global climate governance (Gordon, 2013). It  has gained 
international recognition as a political power and has achieved significant results in several cities 
(Chan,  2016).  Although  there  are  several  other  environmental  city  networks,  such  as  the 
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and the Climate Alliance, the 
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C40 is  the only environmental  network that  focuses on cooperation between cities  specifically, 
giving less priority to municipalities or regions (Chan, 2016). Since 2015, it has introduced a “city 
diplomacy strategy” to further accelerate city action (C40, 2016b). Since Barber’s claim is also 
specifically focused on cities (and not local governments in general), the C40 is pre-eminently a 
network  that  Barber  would  claim  to  be  democratizing  global  governance.  Moreover,  the  C40 
specifically  represents  a  governance  models  that  wants  to  bring  together  different  actors  and 
different levels (Bouteligier, 2013). Thus, if there is one city network that would be expected to 
increase inclusiveness and accountability in global governance, it would be the C40.
UNEP
The  United  Nations  Environment  Programme  (UNEP)  is  one  of  the  most  prominent 
intergovernmental networks on climate change. As part of the UN, it sets the global environmental 
agenda, promotes the coherent implementation of sustainable developments within the UN system 
and serves as an advocate for the global environment in general (UNEP, 2016a). The UNEP is more 
of an integrated organ of the UN than an independent network, but it  does consists of separate 
networks on several different issues, creating a “networking mechanism” (Shende, 2015, p. 139). Its 
mandate was formulated by the General Assembly of the UN, and gives the UNEP the authority and 
responsibility for the environment across the entire United Nations system (UNEP, 2016b). It plays 
a  significant  role  in  organizing  international  environmental  conventions,  such  as  the  COP 
conferences,  in  which  it  brings  together  national  governments,  regional  institution  and  non-
governmental organizations. Even though there are more nation-to-nation environmental networks, 
the UNEP is the leading authority that sets the global environment agenda and is therefore best to 
compare with the C40 (UNEP, 2016a).
Operationalization
Accountability
The principle of accountability can be defined as a relationship in which “an individual, group or 
other entity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to 
impose costs on the agent” (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 77). This principle could be hard to 
operationalize in analyzing global governance, as typical democratic accountability mechanisms 
function along principle-agent relationships using formal, hierarchical channels. These channels are 
often not present in informal and little institutionalized global governance (Hazenberg & Mulieri, 
2013).  However,  both the C40 and UNEP are intergovernmental  networks and are,  in  the end, 
governed  by  elected  officials.  Accountability  mechanisms  between  (city)  governments  and  the 
networks must therefore be present in the C40 as well as in the UNEP. The degree of accountability 
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of the C40 and UNEP will be defined by analyzing the role of city or national governments within 
the structure of the C40 and UNEP. By examining the extent to which national or city governments 
are involved, it can be defined to what extent the organizations can be held accountable be citizens 
through their governments. The data on the level of accountability are retrieved from the websites 
of the C40 and the UNEP, public documents and secondary sources in the form of published journal 
articles and interviews.
Inclusive participation 
To examine  the  inclusiveness  of  the  C40 and the  UNEP,  the  ratio  of  membership  of  cities  or 
countries in of both organizations will be studied along the North-South divide. The North-South 
divide is crucial in studying inclusiveness, since research has shown that there are still common 
interests and norms that unite actors from the North and actors from the South in global governance 
which can be decisive of inequality within an organization (Bouteligier, 2013). Moreover, as noted 
above, globalization is argued to be increasing the gap between the global North and the global 
South.  Hence,  if  city  networks  democratize  global  governance,  this  would  include  more 
inclusiveness  from  the  global  South.  In  this  study,  the  global  North  is  referring  to  wealthy 
industrialized nations including the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and EU member 
states, whereas the global South refers to Asia, Africa and Latin-America.
The divide can also be tricky, as it could suggest a clear-cut distinction between two worlds and 
ignores the variation within the North or the South (Eckl & Weber, 2007). However, analyzing this 
divide will  give the greatest  insight  in  the  inclusiveness  of  the  organizations.  As cosmopolitan 
democracy takes the individual as the main purpose of democracy, the North-South ratio will not 
only be defined by the membership of countries or cities, but also by how many citizens those 
countries and cities have. If there are more members of the South represented in city networks than 
in nation-to-nation networks, this would mean that city networks give voice to actors that might 
otherwise not be heard. This would mean that they would indeed democratize global governance. 
The data on the membership and population of cities in the C40 and UNEP are retrieved from the 
websites of the organizations and the United Nations Statistics Division.
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5. RESULTS
Accountability
The C40 presents itself as being a network that facilitates dialogue amongst city officials (C40, 
2016d).  The C40 stimulates more cooperation between city governments and their  citizens,  for 
example by using “polisdigitocracy” – using social media and data networks to decrease the gap 
between city governments and the citizens living in the city and therefore get the citizens more 
involved in the decision-making process (Chan, 2016, p.  149).  C40’s strategic direction clearly 
focuses  on  linking  the  global  to  the  local  by  improving  connections  and,  thus,  accountability. 
Another example is the C40 Citizens’ Choice Award, which gives cities international recognition for 
local initiatives. By interviewing mayors and city officials that participate in the C40 network, Chan 
(2016) has found that although the C40 does not directly increases local democracy in cities, it  does 
make that cities can represent their citizens’ interests directly on the global stage. The other way 
around, this would mean that citizens can hold their mayors directly accountable for their actions 
within the C40 network. The link between the C40 mayors and local citizens is short, which would 
assume a high level of accountability.
One of the main difficulties of the level of accountability of the C40 is that the organization in 
general  does  not  have a  lot  of  power.  As noted before,  the  C40 is  mainly an organization for 
knowledge exchange and collaboration (C40, 2016a). It does not make policies for the member 
cities and it does not enforce member cities to take certain measures or actions to tackle climate 
change. This horizontal and open structure makes that accountability is not strictly arranged. Cities 
can participate in initiatives and collaborations if they think that it is in the interest of their citizens. 
However if it is not, citizens will probably never know. This could become a problem as soon as the 
C40 increases  in  power over  cities.  The “City Diplomacy” strategy that  the C40 has set  up is 
already a development towards a more united policy strategy of cities in environmental governance 
(Chan, 2016). If this development continues, the accountability of the C40 towards the citizens of 
the member cities might become problematic.
The UNEP, on the other hand, does not only facilitates collaboration and knowledge-sharing, it also 
facilitates multilateral environmental agreements and stimulates the development of international 
environmental law (Bauer, 2009). Moreover, it also sets the global environmental agenda, promotes 
coherent implementation and warrants scrutiny. Hence, the UNEP has a bigger mandate than the 
C40  and  is  accountable  for  more  subjects  than  the  C40.  The  accountability  mechanisms  are, 
therefore, more formal than those of the C40. The UNEP secretariat operates under the auspices of 
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the UN secretary-general, who also appoints the executive director (Bauer, 2009). The Governing 
Council of the UNEP is consisting fifty-eight members, in which all five United Nations regions are 
represented. The council members are elected by the members of the UN General Assembly, and 
mostly consist  officials of the environmental  ministries of states (Haas,  1994).  This means that 
governments officials  are highly involved in the decision-making process of  the UNEP (Bauer, 
2009).  
 
As the UNEP is by far a larger organization as the C40 (see inclusive participation section below), 
the organizational structure is far more complex as well. It consists of a myriad of agencies and 
institutions, which it has to govern based on an even more fragmented policy arena. It is argued that 
the UNEP secretariat has always struggled to coordinate these agencies and institutions (Ivanova, 
2010). Despite UNEP’s flat hierarchy, concerns have been raised regarding a lack of accessibility at 
executive  levels,  the  prevalence  of  a  top-down management  approach,  and  internal  politicking 
(Bauer,  2009).  Many  countries  complain  of  regime  saturation,  arguing  that  the  UNEP and  its 
agencies exceeds their  ability to effectively participate in the management and development on 
particular environmental issues (Haas, 1994). The complex structure of the UNEP decreases the 
level of accountability, as not member states are involved but also NGOs and corporations (UNEP, 
2016b). In this way, the transparency of the accountability mechanisms of the UNEP is less clear 
than that of the C40 which has a simple structure. Although the UNEP has undergone some reforms 
after  these  concerns  were  raised  in  the  1990s,  many  shortcomings  in  coordination  and 
accountability have remained (Ivanova, 2010).
Inclusive participation
The procedures to participate in the C40 or the UNEP are different. The UNEP is a program of the 
UN and is not an independent network of countries. As part of the UN the UNEP has a universal 
membership,  meaning  that  all  members  of  the  UN are  automatically  a  member  of  the  UNEP. 
Membership of the C40, on the other hand, is voluntarily and the C40 does not have a universal 
membership. This is also supported by the fact that just 83 cities are members of the C40. In the 
tables below the member states and cities of the respectively UNEP and C40 are shown by the 
North-South  divide  in  percentages,  as  well  as  the  North-South  divide  of  the  population of  the 
member states and cities.
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The table of the UNEP shows that the North-South ratio between the number of member states and 
the population of those member states is nearly the same (one percent difference). Contrary, the 
table  of  the  C40 shows a  clear  difference  between the  North-South  ratio  of  the  population  of 
member cities and the ratio between member cities in general. Whereas the member cities are not 
far from equally divided between the global North and the global South – 41 percent from the North 
and 59 percent from the South – there is still a large gap between the size of the population of those 
cities – namely 27 percent is from the North and 73 percent from the South. This difference is 
largely due to the ‘innovator cities’, which are member cities that are too small to be qualified as 
megacities  but  have shown ‘clear  leadership’ in  environmental  and climate change work (C40, 
2016d). From the 22 innovator cities, 15 are from the global North and 7 from the global South.
When analyzing the role of the cities from the global North and the global South within the C40, it 
is found that the important functions of the organization are dominated by cities from the North. In 
the  C40 today,  the  C40 Secretariat,  the  Chair  and the  Steering  Committee  set  the  agenda and 
framework  for  action  through C40 (Bouteligier,  2013).  The  Northern  countries  dominate  these 
functions – the Secretariat is in London, the C40 Chair is New York City (and previously London 
and Toronto) and the Steering Committee is currently consisting of Berlin, Hong Kong, Jakarta, 
Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, New York, Saõ Paolo, Seoul, Tokyo. Next to this, the South 
has not hosted any summits, conferences or workshops between 2005 and 2010. The events during 
that time are hosted in Basel, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hong Kong, London, Los Angeles, New York, 
Rotterdam, Seoul and Tokyo. By hosting events,  cities can get the opportunity to influence the 
content and direction of the issues on the agenda. They can influence how problems and solutions 
are frames and which practices are seen as the best practices (Bouteligier, 2013). Thus, by Northern 
cities hosting all C40 meetings, it is probable that cities from the North have had more opportunities 
UNEP Global North Global South
Member states in % 17 84
Population member states in % 16 83
C40 Global North Global South
Member cities in % 41 59
Population member cities in % 27 73
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to influence in the policy-making process of the C40. This inequality in participation is less visible 
in the UNEP, as all the important functions and events are equally distributed among the five UN 
regions (UNEP, 2016a).
In terms of effort,  both the C40 and the UNEP stimulate the Global South to participate more. 
According to Chan (2016), the C40 has made “ongoing efforts” promoting more equality between 
cities in participating in environmental decision-making (Chan, 2016, p. 16). Despite the fact that 
most best practices are still selected from the North (Bouteligier, 2013), the Secretariat of the C40 
has  been  actively  trying  to  overcome  the  North-South  barrier  (Chan,  2016).  The  C40  has 
continually strived to an equal participation of cities from the North and cities from the South, for 
example in the decision-making process. (Chan, 2016). Moreover, the C40 was found to decrease 
technical barriers between cities from the North and cities from the South, by sharing knowledge 
between municipal officials. Member cities do not have to participate in every networks of the C40, 
but  can  solely  participate  in  the  networks  which  they  find most  useful,  so  that  the  sharing  of 
knowledge can be on a deep and detailed level. This means that cities, also from the South, can use 
practical information shared by other cities (Chan, 2016). These examples show that although in 
theory cities from the North have more say in the decision-making process of the C40, it does make 
an effort to get cities from the South involved and overcome barriers between developed cities and 
less developed cities (Chan, 2016).
The  UNEP has  been  actively  supporting  environmental  activities  in  developing  countries  and 
regions of the South (UNEP, 2016c). By rectifying the General Assembly resolutions and UNEP 
Governing Council decisions (UNEP/GC/24/12 and UNEP/GC/25/9), the UNEP has set up a South-
South  Cooperation  program to  enhance  knowledge  sharing  between  countries  from the  Global 
South. According to the UNEP, South-South cooperation is “an essential cross-cutting mechanism 
to enhance UNEP’s ability to deliver environmental capacity.” (UNEP, 2016c). This strategy is not 
only supported by the developing countries itself, but is also supported by the donor community, 
acknowledging that the experiences and successes that many countries of the Global South have 
achieved can provide valuable input,  ideas and means for other countries in the South (UNEP, 
2016c). The office for South-South Cooperation has, among others, developed and implemented a 
policy guidance to facilitate and enhance the systematic integration of South-South Cooperation in 
the UNEP programs and it has set up the UNEP SSC Exchange Mechanism, which is an online tool 
that promotes the sharing of SSC initiatives, events, and success stories (UN Office for South South 
Cooperation, 2016). Not only does the UNEP facilitate more South-South cooperation, it is also 
reinforces progress in South-North cooperation and technology transfer (Shende, 2015).
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6. DISCUSSION
The  results  found  by  the  comparison  of  the  C40  and  the  UNEP are  important  because  they 
contradict  the assumption that  city  networks enhance democracy in global  governance,  at  least 
when looking at accountability and inclusive participation as democratic criteria. The results do not 
show any significant difference between the democratic performance of the C40 and the UNEP. 
However, the inclusiveness of members of the UNEP seem to be more higher than the inclusiveness 
of the C40. How should these finding be interpreted? 
On the principle of accountability, the C40 and the UNEP are hard to compare, as they take on a 
very different role in global governance. Whereas the C40 is mainly an organization for knowledge 
sharing  and  advocacy,  the  UNEP is  the  main  authority  on  environmental  policies  in  global 
governance.  It  is  found that  the  accountability  mechanisms of  the  UNEP are  more formal  and 
strictly organized, whereas this remains unclear for the C40. Although the C40 is a horizontal and 
open network, there is no clear accountability mechanism which ensures that the interests of the 
citizens of cities are represented. Moreover, the criteria of accountability seems not the be of much 
concern  in  the  C40  organization.  An  explanation  for  this  finding  could  be  that  environmental 
governance  networks  are  often  set  up  because  they  are  effective  and  innovative,  rather  than 
democratic per se (Aarsæther, Nyseth, & Bjørnå, 2011). These qualities of city networks are also 
acknowledged by Barber (2013) stating that they enhance “efficiency and productivity” in solving 
global problems (Barber, 2013, preface xx). Thus, the fact that city networks are often not primarily 
set up to democratize global governance, might cause that accountability is not a clearly embedded 
in these networks.
As for the inclusive participation criteria, is it found that the C40 does not enhance participation by 
the Global South.  Some scholars have argued that  city networks are networks “of pioneers for 
pioneers” (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 329). Networks in which cities can voluntarily participate 
often have a more laissez-faire approach, which means that networks do not have the authority to 
force their members to apply specific strategies at the local level. This laissez-faire  approach is 
found to be reinforcing differing patterns of network participation between leading cities and cities 
that are already lagging behind (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Even among city networks in which cities 
join deliberately, there is a clear distinction between the active ‘pioneers’ and a periphery of passive 
cities (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Pioneer municipalities are cities that cities often have joined the 
networks in the early stages of their development. They benefit from the networks as they gain new 
ideas, access to funding and legitimacy at the local level (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Passive network 
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members, on the other hand, often lack financial, human and political resources to participate in 
network activities (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). City networks are thus also described as an “elite-
driven” afffair (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2003). This argument is also reflected in the case of the C40. As 
shown in the results, cities from the North are overrepresented in holding important offices, but also 
in organizing summits,  conferences and other types of meetings.  Assuming that  cities from the 
North often have more resources and thus are more often ‘pioneers’, this would explain why they 
play a more active role in the C40 network. 
There are several limitations to this study that should be acknowledged. First of all, there are plenty 
of other democratic criteria to assess networks, from a cosmopolitan democratic perspective as well 
as criteria derived from Barber (2013). The principle of equality, for example, is often mentioned in 
the literature as a third criteria for democracy (e.g. Hazenberg & Mulieri, 2013). This principle, 
however, is not explicitly defined by cosmopolitan democracy or Barber (2013) as such. As Held 
(1995, p. 208) states: “the ideal [of autonomy] is not in itself an ideal of equality in all political, 
social  and  economic  spheres.  Inequality  is  only  significant  […]  to  the  extent  that  it  bears  on 
participative possibilities and enables or restricts autonomy”. The same goes for other principles 
that could be defined as criteria to define democracy: although these might be important as well, it is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  to  discuss  all  the  criteria  that  could  be  defining  democracy. 
Moreover, as shown in the first subquestion, inclusive participation and accountability cover the 
main purpose of democracy as described by Barber (2013). 
Also, it should be acknowledged that intergovernmental networks between nation-states are still 
more powerful and renowned than city networks, and that environmental problems are generally 
managed by nation-states and international organizations controlled by them (Feldman, 2012). In 
the UNEP every member of the UN participates,  whereas the C40 just consists of 83 affiliated 
cities. This makes that the two networks differ in organizational structure. For example, the UNEP 
has 21 different secretariats whereas the C40 has just one secretariat. The UNEP also has regional 
offices  on  every  continent.  This  makes  that  the  UNEP  is  automatically  more  inclusive  in 
participation,  simply  because  the  organization  is  bigger.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  more 
participants does not necessarily mean more inclusiveness. Also, the fact that the UNEP is more 
powerful  than  the  C40  could  be  an  incentive  for  nations  to  join  this  program,  instead  of 
participating in city networks such as the C40. If cities can already have a saying in a influential 
network such as the UNEP, it might be less of a priority to join a city network as well. The inclusive 
participation of states in the UNEP could thus have an effect on the participation of cities in the 
C40.
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7. CONCLUSION
As John Dryzek (2000, p. 135) once commented: “experimenting with what democracy can mean is 
an  essential  part  of  democracy  itself”.  If  this  is  true,  Barber  (2013)  has  made  a  good  start 
introducing the Global Parliament of Mayors. Barber (2013) argues that in order to democratize 
global governance, cities should be the main actors of decision-making. By governing through city 
networks, cities are assumed to be increasing the democratic performance of international politics. 
In this study, the underlying democratic criteria of Barber (2013) are defined from a cosmopolitan 
democracy perspective.  It  is  argued that  the two main principles of  cosmopolitan democracy – 
accountability and inclusive participation – are reflected in Barber’s perspective of democracy as 
well. Elaborating on these criteria, two intergovernmental networks are analyzed and compared – 
the city-to-city network C40 and the nation-to-nation network UNEP. Overall, this study has found 
that there is no significant difference between the level of accountability and inclusiveness of the 
C40 network and the UNEP. Thus, this study contradicts the assumption that city networks would 
enhance democracy in global governance, at least when using these two democratic criteria based 
on the work of Barber (2013).
These findings have implications for Barber’s idea that cities should ‘rule the world’. If cities might 
in fact not rule more democratically than nation-states, then it could be stated that cities would not 
be the best  decision-makers in international  politics per se – at  least  when arguing in favor of 
democracy in general. Although this study has only focused on city networks, it can be stated that in 
this case cities do not fill in the ‘democratic deficit’ that nation-states are argued to be having in 
global governance. However, further research should find out whether cities in general indeed rule 
evenly democratic as nation-states or not. Research could be done on the role of cities in other types 
of cooperation than networks, for example when cooperating with nation-states or when cities act 
individually. Also, the democratic performance of cities could be studied by defining to what extent 
the party politics of municipalities still plays a role when cities act on the global stage.
Barber not only argues that cities are more democratic, he also puts forward several other arguments 
supporting his claim that cities are the best decision-making actors in governance. For example, 
Barber argues that mayors should be the main policy-making officials, as they are more pragmatic 
and thus govern more efficiently (Barber,  2013).  To assess  this  broader  claim,  further  research 
should be done on how cities govern and what the role of mayors is. Especially as Barber is setting 
up a Global Parliament of Mayors, convening at the end of 2016, it would be useful to study what 
the  consequences  of  this  network  are  on  global  governance.  Although  “experimenting”  with 
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democracy could be the solution to a democratic deficit in governance, this experimenting should be 
studied in itself as well. 
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